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Corrective taxation is a common approach to 
addressing externalities, internalities, and other 
market distortions. These distortions are often 
heterogeneous: for example, some cars pollute 
more than others, and many people consume 
alcohol “rationally’’ even as present biased indi-
viduals might over-consume. Such heterogeneity 
raises the question of whether a corrective tax is 
“well-targeted’’: does it primarily affect individ-
uals subject to relatively large distortions? A tax 
set at the average level of the distortion could 
actually reduce welfare if the marginal individ-
uals were already making relatively undistorted 
decisions.
This paper studies the targeting of corrective 
subsidies for energy efficient durable goods 
such as air conditioners, insulation, and cars. 
These subsidies are justified by multiple distor-
tions, primarily including environmental exter-
nalities, credit constraints, “landlord-tenant’’ 
information asymmetries, imperfect informa-
tion, and “behavioral’’ biases such as inattention 
to energy costs (Allcott and Greenstone 2012; 
Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2009). We 
first argue that these distortions are heteroge-
neous on observables: wealthy people are less 
credit constrained, homeowners are unaffected 
by the “landlord-tenant’’ problem, and we show 
empirically that environmentalists are more 
attentive to energy costs and believe that energy 
efficient goods save more money. We then show 
that three major energy efficiency subsidies are 
Tagging and Targeting of Energy Efficiency Subsidies†
By Hunt Allcott, Christopher Knittel, and Dmitry Taubinsky*
* Allcott: Department of Economics, New York University, 
19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, NBER, and E2e 
(e-mail: hunt.allcott@nyu.edu); Knittel: Sloan School of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 100 
Main Street, E62-520, Cambridge, MA 02142, NBER, 
and E2e (e-mail: knittel@mit.edu); Taubinsky: Harvard 
University, Littauer Center M35, Cambridge, MA 02139, 
and Berkeley (e-mail: taubinsk@fas.harvard.edu). We thank 
Lucas Davis, Ken Gillingham, and Sendhil Mullainathan for 
helpful insights. We are grateful to the Sloan Foundation for 
financial support. 
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151008 to visit 
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
sure statement(s).
 preferentially adopted by consumers who appear 
to be less affected by distortions: wealthy envi-
ronmentalist homeowners. However, we also 
show theoretically that the efficiency gains from 
“tagging’’ are larger when uniform subsidies are 
poorly-targeted.
I. A Model of Optimal Subsidies and Targeting
Our model is a minor modification of the 
model in Allcott and Taubinsky (forthcom-
ing)—henceforth, AT. A unit mass of consum-
ers make a binary choice, which in our case 
represents whether or not to purchase an energy 
efficient good such as insulation or a hybrid car. 
The good is produced at a constant marginal 
cost  c in a perfectly competitive market. A pol-
icymaker can set subsidy  s , so the good’s price 
is  p = c − s .
The social value of purchasing the good is 
v , but consumers have perceived private valua-
tions  v ˆ = v − d . The “distortion’’  d arises from 
the market failures listed above, such as exter-
nalities and internalities. Positive (negative)  d 
means that consumers are distorted away from (toward) the energy efficient good. We model 
two distortion types  j ∈ {L, H} , with population 
shares  α j and distortions  d L <  d H .1 Consumers 
purchase the good if and only if  v ˆ > p .
 Z denotes consumers’ initial wealth,  F j 
denotes type  j ’s cumulative distribution of  v ˆ and 
is assumed to be differentiable,  Q j (p) denotes 
the share of type  j consumers who purchase, 
and  D(p) =  α L  Q L (p) +  α H  Q H (p) denotes total 
demand. The social planner maximizes  W(s) = Z − R(s) +  ∑ j α j  ∫ x≥c−s (x +  d j − p)d F j (x) , 
where  R(s) is a lump-sum transfer that funds the 
subsidy.
1 AT have a continuum of types and allow the distortion 
to depend on  v ˆ and  s , and this does not affect the welfare and 
subsidy formulas below. Allowing  d to depend on  s allows 
consumer awareness of the subsidy to affect valuations, 
which connects to our results in Table 2. 
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A. The Implications of a Poorly-Targeted 
Subsidy
Let  
_
 d =  ∑    α j  d j denote the population 
average distortion, and define “targeting’’ as 
a measure of whether high-distortion types 
are more responsive to the subsidy:  τ (s) ≡ cov( d j ,  −  Q j ′ (c − s)) . We refer to a subsidy 
as well-targeted (poorly-targeted) if  τ (s) is high (low).
Following AT, the welfare impact of a mar-
ginal increase in the subsidy  s is
(1)  W  ′ (s) = (s −  _ d ) ⋅  D ′ (c − s) + τ (s) . 
Thus, a poorly-targeted subsidy generates lower 
welfare gains than a well-targeted subsidy.
The first order condition for equation (1) 
shows that the optimal subsidy must satisfy
(2)  s ∗ =  _ d −  τ (s) _____ 
 D ′ (c − s) . 
Because  D ′ < 0 , the optimal subsidy is increas-
ing in  τ (s) . Thus, a poorly-targeted energy effi-
ciency subsidy could optimally be small, even if 
the population average distortion is large.
B. Tagging Is More Valuable With Poor 
Targeting
We now study the gains from “tagging’’ (Akerlof 1978): limiting eligibility to individu-
als subject to greater distortions. For simplicity, 
we assume that the policymaker can “tag’’ using 
type-specific subsidies  s L and  s H . Define  ΔW 
as the welfare gains from optimal type-specific 
subsidies  s L 
∗ and  s H 
∗ relative to the optimal uni-
form subsidy  s ∗ .
Applying equation (1) to each type’s subsidy 
s j 
∗ shows that  s L 
∗ =  d L and  s H ∗ =  d H . More 
heterogeneity in  d j implies that  s L 
∗ and  s H 
∗ devi-
ate more from  s ∗ , which implies larger  ΔW . 
Proposition 1 shows that  ΔW is also increasing 
in the absolute value of  τ (s) . Intuitively,  ΔW is 
smallest when  s ∗ =  _ d, which occurs when  τ(s) 
is zero.
PROPOSITION 1: If  Q L ′′(p),  Q H ′′ (p) ≈ 0 for 
p ∈ [c −  s H ∗ , c −  s L ∗] , then  ΔW is increasing in |τ (s)| .
II. Empirical Results
A. Distortions Are Heterogeneous on 
Observables
Columns 1–3 of Table 1 test whether envi-
ronmentalists have different factual beliefs 
about the financial savings from energy effi-
cient goods. Although the exact variables 
differ by data source, Environmentalist is a 
variable  ranging from 0–1 that measures indi-
viduals’ self-reported level of environmen-
talism. Column 1 uses the AT data from the 
Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social 
Sciences (TESS) survey panel, showing that 
Table 1—Covariance of Environmentalism with Beliefs and Attention
CFL Energy Star MPG Fuel cost
savings savings savings calculation
Dependent variable belief belief belief effort(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmentalist 7.81 21.04 −2.70 0.193
(3.08)** (4.80)*** (3.24) (0.112)*
Observations 1,475 799 1,392 1,483
Dataset Lightbulbs Water heaters VOAS VOAS
Notes: Dependent variables for columns 1–3 are in percentiles, from 0–100. Dependent variable 
for column 4 is normalized to mean 0, standard deviation 1. OLS regressions with robust stan-
dard errors in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 environmentalists are an average of 7.8 percen-
tiles higher in the distribution of perceived cost 
savings from compact fluorescent lightbulbs 
relative to traditional incandescents. Column 2 
shows that environmentalists in a phone survey 
by Allcott and Sweeney (2014) are an average 
of 21 percentiles higher in the distribution of 
perceived cost savings from Energy Star water 
heaters. Column 3 shows that environmental-
ists in the Vehicle Ownership and Alternatives 
Survey (VOAS), another TESS survey by 
Allcott (2013), do not have statistically differ-
ent beliefs about fuel cost savings from a high-
er-MPG vehicle. Columns 1 and 2 suggest that 
environmentalists have lower  d due to different 
belief biases. Separately, these divergences are 
also remarkable because the survey questions 
elicited factual beliefs about financial savings, 
not opinions about the social value.
The VOAS also asks consumers how precisely 
they calculated fuel costs when purchasing their 
vehicles; we normalize this “fuel cost calcula-
tion effort’’ to standard deviation one. Column 
4 shows that environmentalists exert 0.19 stan-
dard deviations more effort, which suggests that 
environmentalists have lower  d from inattention 
to energy costs.
B. Characteristics of Energy Efficiency  
Subsidy Adopters
Table 2 presents characteristics correlated 
with take-up of energy efficiency subsidies. 
Column 1 analyzes energy efficiency pro-
gram participation at a large utility in the 
United States. The dependent variable is an 
indicator for whether the household claimed 
a  utility-provided subsidy for energy efficient 
appliances, insulation, heating, ventilation, 
and air conditioning, or similar investments 
between January 2007 and April 2009. Subsidy 
recipients are wealthier, which suggests that the 
subsidies are poorly targeted to address credit 
constraints. Take-up is much lower at rental 
homes, which suggests that the subsidies are 
also poorly targeted toward “landlord-tenant’’ 
information asymmetries. Subsidy recipi-
ents are also more likely to have solar energy 
 systems or voluntarily pay extra for renewable 
energy as part of the utility’s green pricing pro-
gram, suggesting that they are environmental-
ists who are already relatively knowledgeable 
about energy-related matters. We note that any 
uninternalized energy use externalities would 
optimally be addressed by setting electricity 
prices at social marginal cost, and this utility 
provides electricity from relatively low-pollu-
tion sources.
Column 2 considers the federal Residential 
Energy Credits, which provide income tax cred-
its for home energy efficiency investments.2 
TESS asks all survey participants if they qual-
ified for this credit in the past two years, and 
the sample combines all TESS data from AT 
and Allcott (2013). Column 3 considers hybrid 
vehicle ownership, which has been heavily sub-
sidized by federal, state, and local governments. 
In these two columns, adopters are again wealth-
ier and more environmentalist. Furthermore, the 
VOAS fuel cost calculation effort coefficients 
are positive, suggesting that more attentive (lower- d ) consumers are more likely to take up, 
even conditional on environmentalism.3
Two mechanisms could generate these 
results. First, many consumers are unaware that 
energy efficiency subsidies are available, and 
the types of consumers that are more aware of 
subsidies might also be more attentive to energy 
costs. Column 4 corroborates this using a ques-
tion from the AT TESS survey, which asked 
consumers whether energy efficiency rebates 
or loans are available in their area. There were 
five possible responses: “Yes,’’ “I think so, but 
I’m not sure,’’ “I’m not sure at all,’’ “I think 
not, but I’m not sure,’’ and “No.’’ Rebates or 
loans exist in most parts of the United States, 
although many consumers are unaware of this: 
38 percent of consumers gave one of the latter 
three responses. We code responses from 1–5, 
with 5 being “Yes’’ and 1 being “No,’’ and nor-
malize the variable to standard deviation one. 
Regression results show that environmental-
ists are 0.248 standard deviations more likely 
to be aware of subsidies, which mechanically 
will make them more responsive to subsidies.4 
2 Some households also qualify by purchasing house-
hold-scale solar, geothermal, and wind energy systems. See 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f5695.pdf for the official IRS 
form. 
3 In column 2, “fuel cost calculation effort” is coded as 
zero for consumers in the AT lightbulbs data, and the regres-
sions include a separate intercept for VOAS consumers. 
4 We include state fixed effects to control for any potential 
correlation between environmentalism and subsidy avail-
ability. When we exclude these controls, the income and 
environmentalism point estimates are slightly more positive. 
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When combined with the above result that 
 environmentalists have lower  d from beliefs 
and attention, this causes poor targeting.
Second, the bottom row of Table 2 shows that 
the subsidies studied in columns 1–3 are applied 
to niche goods with small market shares, so only 
consumers with high perceived valuation  v ˆ will 
tend to be marginal to a moderate subsidy. Low- 
d environmentalist consumers are more likely to 
be high  v ˆ because they experience warm glow 
from conserving energy, which generates a neg-
ative covariance between  d and  v ˆ .
There is one important caveat to these results: 
columns 1–3 study the average adopters, not the 
marginal consumers. Marginal and average are 
equivalent if no consumer would purchase the 
energy efficient good without the subsidy, i.e., 
if  D(c) = 0 . This assumption is tenuous, and 
direct identification of the marginal  consumer 
would be crucial for developing this into a 
fully persuasive argument. (AT present one 
empirical design to identify the average mar-
ginal distortion.) Notwithstanding, the results 
do unambiguously show that these subsidies 
are regressive, as they preferentially accrue to 
wealthier consumers.
III. Policy Implications
There are two policy implications. First, cor-
rective energy efficiency subsidies cannot be 
justified simply by the generic argument that 
“market distortions reduce energy efficiency 
investments’’—we need to show that consumers 
affected by distortions are also affected by the 
subsidies. Even if these subsidies cause energy 
conservation, from a welfare perspective it mat-
ters who is conserving.
Second, tagging could increase the welfare 
gains from energy efficiency subsidies. Indeed, 
Proposition 1 shows that tagging becomes more 
valuable when existing subsidies are more 
 poorly-targeted. Tagging could involve limiting 
subsidy eligibility to low-income households, 
rental properties, or consumers who have not yet 
participated in other utility programs (because 
previous program participation suggests being 
well-informed about energy). If restricting 
 eligibility is not institutionally feasible, targeted 
marketing at these groups would also generate 
gains. Interestingly, some utilities do the oppo-
site—they target marketing at environmentalists 
and previous program participants because they 
Table 2—Correlates of Energy Efficiency Subsidy Take-Up
Dependent variable 1(Take up 1(Take up 1(Own Subsidy
utility subsidy) tax credit) hybrid) awareness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Green pricing participant) 0.015
(0.004)***
1(Installed solar system) 0.892
(0.002)***
Income ($ millions) 0.543 0.505 0.278 1.022
(0.066)*** (0.152)*** (0.136)** (0.720)
1(Rent) −0.068 −0.084
(0.007)*** (0.081)
Environmentalist 0.121 0.020 0.248
(0.024)*** (0.008)** (0.116)**
Fuel cost calculation effort 0.027 0.017
(0.011)** (0.007)**
Observations 75,591 2,982 1,483 1,516
Dataset Utility All TESS VOAS Lightbulbs
Dependent variable mean 0.109 0.102 0.013 0
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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are more likely to be interested in energy effi-
ciency. While this may be a cost-effective way 
to comply with existing energy efficiency regu-
lation, our analysis shows that this may be eco-
nomically inefficient.
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